NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION

United States Antarctic Program (USAP) Blue Ribbon Panel; Notice of Meeting

In accordance with the Federal Advisory Committee Act (Pub. L. 92–463, as amended), the National Science Foundation announces the following meeting.

Name: United States Antarctic (USAP) Program Blue Ribbon Panel (#1531).

Date & Time: December 20, 8:00 a.m.–6:00 p.m.; December 31, 1996, 8:30 a.m.–5 p.m.

Place: Room 1235, NSF, 4201 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, VA.

Type of Meeting: Open.

Contact Person: Guy G. Guthridge, Office of Polar Programs, Room 755, National Science Foundation, 4201 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, Virginia 22230. Telephone: (703) 306–1031.

Minutes: May be obtained from the contact person listed above.

Purpose of Meeting: Examine a full range of infrastructure, management, and scientific options for the United States Antarctic Program so that the Foundation will be able to maintain the high quality of research and implement U.S. policy in Antarctica under realistic budget scenarios.

Agenda: The committee will continue analysis begun at its first meeting (October 11–12, 1996). It will receive presentations from Antarctic experts and will discuss options in the areas of research, research support, contractor tasking, military transition, cost-saving initiatives, health and safety context, environment and waste management, South Pole redevelopment, international aspects, science users' perspectives, and interagency involvement.

Dated: November 27, 1996.

M. Rebecca Winkler,

Committee Management Officer.

[FR Doc. 96–30777 Filed 12–3–96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7555–01–M

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Sunshine Act Meeting

TIME: 9:30 a.m., Wednesday, December 11, 1996.

PLACE: The Board Room, 5th Floor, 490 L'Enfant Plaza, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20594.

STATUS: Open.

MATTERS TO BE DISCUSSED:

6781 Aviation Accident Report: Ground Spoiler Activation in Flight/Hard Landing, ValuJet Airlines Flight 558, Douglas DC–9–32, N922VV, Nashville International Airport, Nashville, Tennessee, January 7, 1996.

6675A Railroad Accident Report: Derailment of Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company Train H–BALT1–31, Near Cajon Junction, California, February 1, 1996.

NEWS MEDIA CONTACT: Telephone: (202) 314–6100.

FOR MORE INFORMATION CONTACT: Bea Hardesty, (202) 314–6065.

November 29, 1996.

Bea Hardesty,

Federal Register Liaison Officer.

[FR Doc. 96–30937 Filed 12–2–96; 11:36 am]

BILLING CODE 7533–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50–368]

Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2; Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amedment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination and Opportunity for a Hearing

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License No. NPF–6 issued to Entergy Operations, Inc. for operation of Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 (ANO–2) located in Pope County, Arkansas.

The proposed amendments would change the surveillance requirements for the Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 (ANO–2) steam generator tubing. This proposed change references a new generic topical report (CEN–630–P, ''Repair of ¾″ O.D. Steam Generator Tubes Using Leak-Tight Sleeves,'' Revision 01, November 1996).

Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.

The Commission has made a proposed determination that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

Criterion 1—Does Not Involve a Significant Increase in the Probability or Consequences of an Accident Previously Evaluated.

The proposed amendment continues to allow the ABB/Combustion Engineering (CE) tungsten inert gas (TIG) welded expansion transition zone (ETZ) and tube support sleeves to be used as an alternate tube repair method for the Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 (ANO–2) steam generators along with process improvements which are included in the topical report to be referenced. The sleeve configuration was designed and analyzed in accordance with the criteria of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.121 and Section III of the ASME Code and is unaffected by the enhancements that will be implemented. The consequences of leakage through the sleeved region of the tube, including the proposed enhancements, is bounded by the existing steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) analysis included in the ANO–2 Safety Analysis Report.

The proposed change reflects enhancements made to the installation inspection process which is identified in the currently licensed topical report (CEN–601–P, Revision 01–P). The new topical report (CEN–630–P, Revision 01) specifies that proper cleaning and inspection of the weld zone be performed prior to sleeve installation. Also, eddy current testing (ECT) has been added as part of the sleeve acceptance criteria to ensure the structural integrity of the tube-to-sleeve weld joint. The ECT added allows disposition of certain non-significant indications outside the sleeve's pressure boundary without subsequent repair of the tube. Other changes caused by referencing a generic topical report, instead of a site-specific analysis, increase the conservatism already present with the currently licensed process. The lower primary-to-secondary leakage limit ensures that any dose contributed from a potential steam generator tube leak will be considerably lower than the dosage specified in 10 CFR 100.

Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated.

Criterion 2—Does Not Create the Possibility of a New or Different Kind of Accident from any Previously Evaluated.

The proposed change to implement CEN–630–P, Revision 1, will not create a new or different type of accident. The changes reflect enhancements to the currently licensed installation/inspection process and would not affect any hypothetical accident as a result of potential tube or sleeve degradation in the repaired portion of the tube. Such hypothetical accidents remain bounded by the existing SGTR analysis. The sleeve design does not affect any other component or portion of the steam generator tube outside of the immediate area repaired.

Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

Criterion 3—Does Not Involve a Significant Reduction in the Margin of Safety.

The currently licensed TIG welded sleeving repair of degraded steam generator tubes has been shown by analysis to restore